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Aristotle's Critique of Mimesis: 
The Romantic Prelude 
TERRYL L. GIVENS 
The most notable element of Plato's theory of art, or at least the most 
memorable, is his censorship of poetry from the ideal state (Republic III: 
398; X: 607). However Plato's argument is construed, it is enlightening to 
note the domestication to which it is invariably subjected. Since Aristotle's 
theory is eminently more amenable to our contemporary appreciation for 
art, and, in one form or another, is judged more central to the history of 
Western literature, Plato's attack is dispensed with after due characteriza- 
tion as ironic,1 unmanageably ambiguous,2 valid only in a most limited 
context,3 or excusable in the light of the extraordinary circumstances pecu- 
liar to Plato's profession, day, and society (his philosophic loyalties,4 didac- 
ticism as a norm,5 and the decadence of Athenian literature).6 Now we 
could dispense with the assertions that his ban was an ironic gesture or 
innocuously hypothetical by pointing out that while the Republic Plato 
envisioned, in earnest or not, was never realized, the attack on art he 
espoused was tangible enough in its repercussions. And as for the argument 
that the extraordinary circumstances of Plato's day preclude the validity of 
the theory it fostered, it must be remembered that later philosophers were 
not indifferent to the role of art in man's moral and intellectual develop- 
ment, classical Athens was far from the least aesthetically sophisticated of 
societies, and literature of that period was neither significantly more subver- 
sive nor more edifying than our own. (And obviously these circumstances 
did not predetermine the conclusions of Plato's famous student. ) 
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But rather than address these attempts to neutralize Plato's objections 
to art, we might with profit ask why such an impulse has been so persis- 
tent and so powerful, and how this tendency may have significantly 
conditioned our understanding of important chapters in the history of 
aesthetics. Plato's condemnation of poetry rests upon his equation of art 
with imitation and his assessment of the inherent failings - metaphysical 
and ethical - of art-as-mimesis. Thus, when Plato's attack on art is dis- 
missed, his impact on the mimetic tradition is minimized or dismissed ipso 
facto. This move therefore makes possible a condition that, given the long 
and complex history of mimesis, is a dubious state of affairs. 
The prominence of the principle of mimesis in Western literature and 
critical history amounts to what John Boyd has called "twenty-three centu- 
ries of ... hegemony."7 This lengthy hegemony would seem to presup- 
pose the enduring vitality of a fairly constant, coherent concept. But such 
a monolithic characterization of critical history would clash with an ad- 
mittedly diverse - radically diverse - array of concepts at times only 
obliquely related under the rubric of "mimesis."8 The solution has been to 
assign one of those significations commanding authority - and it is not 
Plato's. 
In the only full-length treatment of mimesis in the English language, 
Boyd argues that the mimetic tradition is largely the history of a concept 
that is grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted, amounting finally to an 
utter "decay in the critical understanding of mimesis."9 In spite of the fact 
that mimesis has a history predating Plato and continuing to the present, 
Boyd does articulate a suprahistorical definition: the Aristotelian. Mime- 
sis is the probable rendered into structure. He complains that this 
structure-grounded meaning is replaced, by the late eighteenth century, 
by an attenuated mimesis that comes to assume a "time-place context of 
meaning." By this "empirical and superficial notion of mimesis" he means 
an emphasis on the representational aspect rather than the cognitive 
element. 10 Boyd is certainly not the first to see the history of this concept 
as the corruption of Aristotelian mimesis. In his learned study of 
eighteenth-century mimesis John Draper chronicles the two "false mean- 
ings [which] passed current in England as vulgate Aristotelianism": "one 
making it a copy of actions and things, the other a copy of accepted 
masterpieces."11 Even earlier, Irving Babbitt described how, "while claim- 
ing to follow Aristotle, these [neo-classicist] theorists really became 
pseudo- Aristotelian. "12 
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This dominance of the Aristotelian paradigm is problematic because a 
position that simultaneously asserts the centrality and the corruption of 
Aristotelian mimesis runs the risk of blurring questions of history and 
semantics, of confusing descriptive and prescriptive aesthetics. I would 
suggest that the vital interrelationship of literary theory and literary his- 
tory may be better illuminated by shifting attention to the dynamics of 
that theory which initiated the mimetic tradition rather than tracing the 
decline of what might have proved a more enduring centerpiece of literary 
theory, the Aristotelian art-as-the-probable. 
By reasserting the primacy of the Platonic paradigm, it becomes possi- 
ble to see the Aristotelian response for what it more properly is: not an 
alternative to Platonic mimesis, but rather a critique of the possibility of 
mimesis itself in any meaningful sense. As I hope to suggest, the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century dismantling of mimesis which we 
call Romanticism is no more than the rendering explicit and specific of 
what in Aristotle's critique is embryonic. 
Aristotle's name writ large in the history of mimesis obscures the impli- 
cations of his discussion not being the first, nor ultimately the most influen- 
tial. (That Aristotelian mimesis is not central to the mimetic tradition is 
tacitly acknowledged in any account of apostasy from the Aristotelian 
position, like Boyd's, Draper's, and Babbitt's. ) Of course even though Plato 
was the first to use the word in an extended discussion of art, even he was 
appropriating a term with a well-established meaning. As H. Koller writes, 
Dabei ergab sich, daB ui|Aï]aiç "Nachahmung" bedeuten Jcann, daB 
das Wort aber im iibrigen ein ganz anderes Bedeutungsfeld besitzt 
als die Ausdrùcke "Nachahmung", "imitatio". Sein Bedeutungs- 
zentrum liegt im Tanz. \ii\u\otc heiBt primàr: durch Tanz zur 
Darstellung bringen. 
[The result was that |U|xr|Oiç can mean "imitation," but that the 
word otherwise has a semantic range entirely apart from the terms 
"imitation," "imitatio." Its central meaning lies in dance, \ii\ir\oic, 
means primarily: to effect a representation through dance.]13 
This is not to say that philological origins are determinative of a word's 
"true meaning." It is to say that if neoclassical conceptions of mimesis as 
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"empirical" or as "copy of actions" are considered naive and superficial, 
good precedent exists. Plato, of course, is at times still very close to this 
root context of mime or dance, as when he refers to the two fundamental 
styles of poetry as simple narration and impersonation (which he calls 
mimesis); hence his appellation of poets as "pantomimic gentlemen" (Re- 
public III: 398). H And Plato's treatment of mimesis is not one that Aris- 
totle's simply supplanted. 
Plato's treatment - and condemnation - of art included a challenge 
that subsequent critics could not possibly resist: "let us assure our sweet 
friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title 
to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her" 
(X:607). The unacceptability of Plato's mimesis-centered theory of art 
meant that Aristotle's poetics was a rebuttal before it was a proposal. 
Plato, of course, was the first to transpose this term to the poetic arts in 
something approaching systematic fashion. We must not forget this fact, 
since Aristotle, before he can articulate a new vision of the nature and 
function of poetry, must first address head-on the Platonic attack on art, 
that is, on art-as-mimesis. Aristotle's discussion of mimesis is, therefore, 
ab initio a critique of (Platonic) mimesis. It seems most reasonable, hence, 
to at least consider Aristotle not as "the originator of the imitative fal- 
lacy,"15 but as its first critic. And the possibility is now advanced that the 
collapse of mimesis in the eighteenth century is the working out of an 
Aristotelian critique of mimesis, rather than an abandonment or distor- 
tion of Aristotelianism. 
As Gerald Else remarks, mimesis is the "master-concept" of the Poet- 
ics. 16 His daunting study is largely the anatomy of the "drastic revision" of 
Plato's concept by Aristotle, which revision, he argues, constitutes "in 
effect a new theory."17 But if Plato's version of mimesis led him to con- 
demn art as immoral, deceptive, and unphilosophic, and Aristotle's re- 
vised theory entailed no such conclusions, then we need to locate the 
point of departure, and how Aristotle manages to disarm the Platonic 
argument. It will here prove helpful to outline the essential features of a 
theoretical model for mimesis, in light of which we may frame our com- 
parative analysis of Plato and Aristotle. 
Reducing the principle of mimesis to its essential elements, we find that 
whether we interpret the term as imitation, representation, copying, mim- 
icking, etc., three things are constant: an object of representation, which 
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we may call the model, the product of representation, or the presented 
object, and some relation of likeness that obtains between them. It has 
been traditional to characterize mimetic theories according to variations 
in the first constant alone, the model; imitation is of the ancients (Hor- 
ace), of nature's entelechy (Aristotle), or of surface appearances (Plato). 
Such an approach distorts Plato, obviates Aristotle's critique of Plato, and 
misdirects the study of eighteenth-century mimesis and its decline. 
First, the case of Plato. It is simply reductive and inaccurate to equate 
Plato's mimesis with copying of superficial appearances. Certainly this 
view is indicated in his bed analogy. But at other times he refers to the 
imitation of virtues and character traits (Rep. Ill: 395) or even to non- 
existent hypothetical entities or "patterns," as in his discussion with 
Glaucon: 
Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delin- 
eated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, 
he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed? 
He would be none the worse. 
Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State? (Rep. 
V: 472) 
J. Ta te argues convincingly that at least on some occasions Plato uses 
mimesis to refer to the use of a "divine paradigm," in which the "ideal 
world" is imitated.18 Boyd, as well, acknowledges that in The Laws Plato 
"admired an ideal poetry, which sought to reveal the forms, the perfection 
of human life as it should be lived."19 (These last two judgments would 
diminish considerably the distance separating Plato's "superficial copying" 
from Aristotle's mimesis as a structure with universal significance.) 
The real question, however, is not "what elements of Plato's theory of 
art-as-mimesis will render it most justifiable, most redeemable?" but rather 
"what aspect of mimesis leads Plato to condemn art?" At least, the latter is 
the dilemma that Aristotle inherited, and that his or any revisionary theory 
of art would have to address. It has been widely argued that it is precisely 
those times when imitation is of superficial appearances only that Plato 
condemns art,20 and that Aristotle dispensed with this problem by redefin- 
ing mimesis in terms of the model.21 However, if we examine various 
contexts for Plato's attack on art, we see that the common denominator in 
his examples is not to be found in the model. Three examples will suffice. 
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If we confine ourselves to the discussion of art in the Republic, we may 
summarize Plato's objections to mimesis as either ethical or metaphysical. 
On the one hand, Plato argues in book III that imitation may corrupt by 
providing accounts that, however accurate, are inappropriate models of 
conduct. Neither the horror of death and "the world below," nor exces- 
sive levity, nor lasciviousness are "meet for the ears of boys and men who 
are meant to be free" (III: 387). After dealing with the negative conse- 
quences of such poetic subjects, Plato turns to a critique of what he sees as 
the detriments of imitative style. Personation, the enactment of alien 
personalities and actions, is condemned because 1) "no one man can 
imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one" and 2) the 
youth of Athens "should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind of 
illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what 
they imitate" (394-5). 
In book X, on the other hand, Plato turns to his metaphysical or 
ontological critique of imitative art. Plato considers only the ideal to be 
"true existence" (X: 601), and he faults art for its being thrice removed 
from this ideal, as the bed analogy demonstrates. A close look at this 
discussion reveals that for Plato an artistic representation does not "fall 
short" of the ideal, as much as it distorts it by what it adds. This fact is 
implicit in Plato's explanation of the uniqueness of the ideal in terms of a 
tertium comparationis argument: 
God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in 
nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever 
have been nor ever will be made by God. 
Why is that? 
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear 
behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and 
that would be the ideal bed and not the two others. (X: 597) 
What this means is that any two objects exhibiting any relationship of 
likeness will always imply a third object, with respect to which they are 
similar. This third object would therefore be essentially similar to the two 
objects, but would differ in leaving only potential what they render ac- 
tual, thereby establishing their identity and difference. But what this 
statement further implies is that an ideal object (Plato's Idea) will always 
be distinguished from any concrete manifestation or replica thereof, by 
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virtue of that ideal object's state of potentiality. To render an ideal particu- 
lar is therefore inevitably to actualize some of its potential features, while 
inevitably leaving some undetermined. An artistic representation, there- 
fore, is always distinguished from the ideal not only because it confines 
itself to the presentation of a phenomenal aspect of the ideal, but because 
it particularizes it, and thus concretizes or actualizes variables only latent 
in the model. 
Ironically, art is also condemned for falling short of the physical. Plato's 
idealism leads us to assume that art, being the product of physical media- 
tion and therefore at two removes from the eidos, or "true existence," is 
condemned for this remoteness.22 But that would be to oversimplify 
Plato's scheme. That more is at stake emerges from Plato's question to 
Glaucon about the carpenter: " 'is not he also the maker of the bed?' 'Yes.' 
'But would you call the painter a ... maker?' 'Certainly not' " (X: 597). 
Both God and carpenters may be called "makers," while the painter may 
not. Why, if the bed is clearly a particularization of the ideal just as the 
painting is? Because the carpenter's bed, regardless of its not being "a real 
object" ("he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of 
existence" - 597), is sufficiently distinct from its model to be free from 
the charge of deceptiveness. Moreover, its existence and subsistence are 
dependent upon an independent function (reclining) which further distin- 
guishes it from its ideal model. It therefore constitutes a distinct, autono- 
mous object. The painting, on the other hand, "is designed to be - an 
imitation of things ... as they appear." With imitation as its end, its 
existence and subsistence are model-dependent. And if its end is 
achieved, "if he is a good painter, [the artist] may deceive" (598). 
This deception is in fact inevitably realized to some degree, if not fully, 
as the result of the transformation of a physical model via a representa- 
tional medium and into a presented object. In making this criticism, Plato 
must raise an objection that is the virtual converse of the problem we 
have seen with rendering the ideal into art (the particularization of the 
essential, the making actual of the potential). When the model is physi- 
cal, the artist will unavoidably produce an object that leaves schematic 
and indeterminate that which in the model is fully determinate and 
actualized.23 Still in the context of the bed analogy, Plato relates this 
weakness to the deceptive nature of human perception itself: "you may 
look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from 
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any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no 
difference in reality" (X: 598). Similarly, an artist can do no more than to 
"lightly touch ... on a small part of [the model]" (X: 598). It is the fact 
that art emulates this perspectival limitation, and not art's degree of ontic 
remove from the ideal, which is the essence of this stage in the critique. 
Art thus falls into a double bind, in that it is condemned with specific 
relation to both the ideal and the physical for opposite reasons. 
In this discussion of the bed analogy, then, the bed is at one remove 
from the ideal, but carpenters are not therefore vilified. Neither carpen- 
ters nor painters are faulted strictly in terms of their position per se in a 
metaphysical hierarchy. Rather, each is evaluated according to its rela- 
tion to its presumed model. In the case of representational art, we may 
now call that relationship one of pseudo- identity. Even in this, the most 
philosophical of Plato's objections, the bottom line is ethical, not onto- 
logical: "if he is a good painter, he may deceive." Not, it must be empha- 
sized, because he falls into deceitfulness, but as a consequence of practic- 
ing his art well. 
We have now arrived at the crux of Plato's critique of mimetic art. 
Whether his condemnation is considered to be ontological, didactic, or 
moral, his arguments have one essential feature in common, but only one. 
They presume neither a common model (it may be historical, physical, or 
ideal) nor a common medium (poetry or painting). But all are predicated 
upon a criticism of art's effects, art's fearful power. This power inheres 
neither in the model nor in the presented object itself, but in the illusory 
potential of that relationship which joins and confuses them. It is the 
potential for this paramount degree of likeness or correspondence, for a 
misguided identification of model with presented object, which is the sine 
qua non of Platonic mimesis. 
Obviously, this confusion of the work of art with the model cannot be 
taken to mean that a bird will attempt to eat a poem about fruit, in the 
same way that hungry birds were said to attack the canvases of the legend- 
ary Zeuxis. Or, in Plato's terms, a painting of a bed may "deceive at a 
distance," but a poem about one will not. 
Roman Jakobson has already raised this objection: 
While in painting and in the other visual arts the illusion of an 
objective and absolute faithfulness to reality is conceivable, "natu- 
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ral" (in Plato's terminology), verisimilitude in a verbal expression 
or in a literary description makes no sense whatever.24 
I would argue that, on the contrary, any time representational art acts 
upon us so as to elicit responses appropriate to the model it imitates, 
illusion, i.e., effectual displacement in our consciousness of the represen- 
tation by the model, has occurred. Plato obviously concurred that the 
delusory implications of mimesis were not substantially different from 
medium to medium. 
This pseudo- identity is the most important feature of Plato's discussion 
of mimesis (as it will prove to be pivotal in the concept's history and 
demise), and one that has received scant attention. This is the more 
significant, considering that mimesis is generally defined, its various us- 
ages differentiated, on the basis of the object imitated (is it antiquity, the 
classics, nature, life?). The constant in Plato's several remarks on mime- 
sis, and the feature that determines his condemnation of the imitative 
arts, is the confusion of the model with the presented object. Whether we 
choose to locate that confusion in audience misperception, leading to 
undesirable consequences (and thus enable a reading of Plato's ban as 
ironic, given his ability to differentiate), or whether we attribute that 
confusion to Plato's insistence that art is, in its most fundamental dimen- 
sion, imitative, does not immediately matter. Because the false teaching, 
the emotional debilitation, and the metaphysical shortcomings all depend 
for their ill-effects upon an unrestrained potential for art to function in an 
illusory way, for the representational medium to fade into transparency, 
the presented object to feign the authenticity of the model, for difference 
to masquerade as sameness. 
If this is true, then Aristotle's challenge is clear. He must address 
neither the appropriateness of the model nor the effects of the presented 
object, but rather the degree of likeness that can conceivably obtain 
between them, the limits of semblance that are possible, for therein lies 
the key to the condemnation or the rehabilitation of art-as-mimesis. 
Certainly it would be easiest for Aristotle to simply bypass the Platonic 
objections to art. He could do this by arguing that art is not mimesis, not 
an attempt to replicate a model, but an object sui generis, to be judged on 
its own merits. Or he could argue that mimesis is properly understood in a 
far less restrictive sense than Plato, thus freeing art from the demand that 
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it conform in every particular to the model on which it is based. While 
both of these points may be seen as implicit in the position Aristotle 
articulates, by themselves they fail to address the objectionability of art's 
seductive verisimilitude that is the heart of Plato's complaint. 
It is the nature of that correspondence between real world and "realis- 
tic" art on which Plato's condemnation of art hinges, and to which 
Aristotle first directs himself. He therefore begins with Plato's premise 
that the various arts are, indeed, essentially characterized as forms of 
imitation (jrâoai xvyxàvovoiv ovoai \i\ir\OEic, to ovvoXov [1447a 15- 
16]).25 And then Aristotle immediately addresses the charge that it is the 
appeal of art, its seductive power to please while corrupting by causing us 
to confound illusion with reality, that calls for art's condemnation. In 
chapter 4 of the Poetics Aristotle, in analyzing the sources of aesthetic 
pleasure, undermines this Platonic objection and the mimetic principle it 
presumes: "Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to 
contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity" (1448b). Aristotle is 
here alluding to an instance of the principle of aesthetic distance. This 
remark is a surprisingly simple indication of Plato's failed critique. For in 
the example Aristotle cites, the unpleasant experience of beholding a 
corpse is transformed through a representational medium, into the pleas- 
ant experience of apprehending its representation. Clearly, the object of 
apperception is not the same in the two cases. Consequently, the imita- 
tive intention (to present an unpleasant subject matter) is utterly 
thwarted. 
This product of imitation (which I will call "representation," as distinct 
from the activity, "imitation"26) exhibits characteristics, in fact, an entire 
ontology, quite distinct from and independent of its model. It is a distinc- 
tion dramatically emphasized by divergent experiences of the model and 
of its representation, a divergence not anticipated in the notion of imita- 
tion itself. The relation of model to presented object can never, therefore, 
transcend mere approximation. And this is not an approximation suffi- 
cient to elicit the consequences so deplored by Plato. 
Aristotle's theory of catharsis may be seen as further corroboration of 
Aristotle's insistence on the inescapability of aesthetic distance and its 
corollary: imitation may legitimately be considered as motivational or 
causal, but never as descriptive of the quiddity of art itself, since the 
distinction between model and product is not accidental but fundamen- 
tal. The ugliness of the corpse is not diluted; it is displaced by a quality 
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which evokes pleasure. Similarly, in the case of catharsis,27 emotional 
benefits are seen to accrue from the depiction of tragedy and horror. Such 
an effect would require that audience identification with the flawed char- 
acters stop short of emulation or emotional confusion. These errors can 
only be avoided if at some point in the viewing of the spectacle, detach- 
ment occurs to turn emotional seduction into moral betterment (in a 
manner analogous to the transformation of a corpse's ugliness into aes- 
thetic pleasure). 
And finally, Aristotle again confirms that imitation is inessential as a 
characteristic of art when he discusses the antlered doe. In chapter 25, he 
reaffirms and reemphasizes the threads of his anti-mimetic critique.28 He 
concedes the place of imitation in the creative process as one that com- 
bines a universal impulse to mimic with an unrestricted range of models. 
The artist "must imitate . . . things as they were or are, things as they are 
said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be" (1460b). He immedi- 
ately proceeds to disabuse his audience of false conclusions about the 
propriety of judging the products of such imitations in accordance with 
the Platonic model. Neither ethics ("the standard of correctness is not the 
same in poetry and politics" [1460b]) nor fidelity to a model is an appropri- 
ate standard. To illustrate the latter point, Aristotle uses an extreme case. 
A doe neither has, is said to have, nor ought to have antlers. If an artist 
inadvertently renders them in a painting (through "wrong choice" or 
"technical inaccuracy"), then we have a blatant discrepancy between the 
model (whether it was real or ideal) and the presented object, and a prime 
candidate for Plato's objections. Here Aristotle underscores his break with 
Plato, by emphasizing that such a failing pertains not to what "touches the 
essence" of art, but to what is "accidental" to it: "not to know that a hind 
has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically" 
(1460b). Platonic imitation, whereby art is evaluated according to the 
integrity of its product, i.e., its correspondence to originary model, is 
adjudged neither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition for successful 
art. This critique must be seen as predicated upon an already demon- 
strated disjunction between the imitative process and the independent 
representation as product. Aesthetic distance is evidence of a paradigm 
that is inappropriate because it is impossible. We might say that for Plato, 
art is condemned because it imitates so well without imitating perfectly. 
For Aristotle, art is redeemed because it cannot imitate that well after all, 
and so imitates artistically. 
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If the foregoing is true, then it is not sufficient to say, as does Else, that 
in Aristotle's hands mimesis is transformed into "a really new idea."29 For 
it is essential to Aristotle's purposes methodically and systematically to 
remove mimesis from its central position in literary theory. Plato's objec- 
tions were simply not controvertible by reintroducing more appropriate 
models or expanding the concept of imitation to allow more freedom. The 
problem, as we have seen, was in the degree of likeness implied by the 
very concept of imitation, and which if admitted as a perennial possibil- 
ity, doomed art to perennial suspicion and censure. So Aristotle had to 
wrench the work of art free from the tyranny of a model it could never 
successfully emulate. And this independence of the presented object is 
simply not reconcilable with mimesis in any meaningful sense (other than 
as descriptive of the origin or process of artistic creation). But to remove 
mimesis as the essential characterization of the work of art is simulta- 
neously to remove the grounds of aesthetic quality, since pleasure can no 
longer be predicated upon the features of the model imitated ("if you 
happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the 
imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other 
cause" [1448b]). 
Aristotle knows that an alternate theory of the grounding of aesthetic 
quality is required of his poetics, and is in fact already indicated in the 
observation that pleasure accrues from depiction of unpleasant subjects. 
In such a case, the aesthetic quality of a work obviously cannot derive 
from the model or evocation of the model. The enjoyment which Aris- 
totle notes must obtain in spite of the accuracy of representation, not 
because of it. For the nearer a representation comes to replace mere 
resemblance with the illusion of identity, the more our experience of the 
representation would approximate our experience of the reality. Hence, 
the more accurate the painting, the more illusional, the more it should 
repel us (if a base object). But in art, just the reverse proves to be the case. 
Our negative response to reality has been displaced by a positive response 
to a semblance. Evidently, then, a representation's accuracy, its impulse 
toward illusion, is opposed by a deeper aesthetic dimension which pleases 
only by a transformation, not replication, of its object, creating in the 
process new (aesthetic) qualities. 
This aesthetic grounding, of course, is precisely the function of Aris- 
totle's mythos. His working out of this element of tragedy is framed in 
terms orchestrated to fill the void left by a dismantled mimesis. Mythos is 
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defined in three essential ways, all of which emphatically assert its role as 
grounding aesthetic quality; organic unity, the probable impossible, and 
the self-determination of beginning, middle, and end, are all means 
whereby the work as a thing made is freed from any essential reliance 
upon or reference to an external model. 
The irony in the mimetic tradition is that Aristotle, having successfully 
emasculated the concept of mimesis by reducing it to a motivational or 
foundational role, or descriptive of a process, has been repeatedly thrust 
into the role of being father to a tradition he did so much to disavow and 
reform. His real (though unrecognized) accomplishment was to have redi- 
rected critical theory to the issue of artistic transformation - how represen- 
tation restructures our experiences of reality, not how art parallels reality. It 
is from his perception of this uniqueness of the aesthetic experience that 
Aristotle infers the uniqueness of the work itself. In specific opposition to 
Plato's demand that art serve a referential function, Aristotle poses the 
objection that fundamental to the nature of representation are particular 
features we experience in a manner quite incongruous with our lived experi- 
ence of the world itself. The work of art and the world it embodies are thus 
recognized to exist for us in a manner quite unlike the way autonomous 
objects exist. Aristotle does not pursue this insight. The investigation of 
the unique ontology and phenomenology of the work of art would not begin 
in earnest until the eighteenth century. But Aristotle does lay the founda- 
tion for its consideration as an object of a peculiar kind. 
The pertinent question now raised is, How does the literary medium 
necessarily modify our experience we call aesthetic? It is, in fact, this line 
of questioning that will ultimately be pursued to the final collapse of 
mimesis in the eighteenth century. Beginning with the revolt against 
Cartesian linguistics in the seventeenth century (and its ideal of a pure, 
transparent language) and culminating in the work of the pre-Romantics, 
the essential constant of the mimetic paradigm will again be perceived as 
the degree of likeness to a model attainable through art, and not the 
model itself. And, in the writings of Descartes, Vico, Diderot, Shelley, 
and their contemporaries, the critique of mimesis will but elaborate Aris- 
totle's fundamental insight into the limits of semblance imposed by a 
representational medium.30 
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